With an increasing number of value-flow properties to check, existing static program analysis still tends to have scalability issues when high precision is required. We observe that the key design flaw behind the scalability problem is that the core static analysis engine is oblivious of the mutual synergies among different properties being checked and, thus, inevitably loses many optimization opportunities. Our approach is inter-property-aware and able to capture possible overlaps and inconsistencies among different properties. Thus, before analyzing a program, we can make optimization plans which decide how to reuse the specific analysis results of a property to speed up checking other properties. Such a synergistic interaction among the properties significantly improves the analysis performance. We have evaluated our approach by checking twenty value-flow properties in standard benchmark programs and ten real-world software systems. The results demonstrate that our approach is more than 8× faster than existing ones but consumes only 1/7 memory. Such a substantial improvement in analysis efficiency is not achieved by sacrificing the effectiveness: at the time of writing, thirty-nine bugs found by our approach have been fixed by developers and four of them have been assigned CVE IDs due to their security impact.
INTRODUCTION
Value flows [12, 33, 40, 43] , which track how values are loaded and stored in the program, underpin the analysis for a broad category of software properties, such as memory safety (e.g., null dereference, double free, etc.), resource usage (e.g., memory leak, file usage, etc.), and security properties (e.g., the use of tainted data). In addition, there are a large and growing number of domain-specific valueflow properties. For instance, mobile software requires that the personal information cannot be passed to an untrusted code [2] , and, in web applications, tainted database queries are not allowed to be executed [45] . Fortify, 1 a commercial static code analyzer, checks nearly ten thousand value-flow properties from hundreds of unique categories. Value flow problems exhibit a very high degree of versatility, which poses great challenges to the effectiveness of general-purpose program analysis tools.
Faced with such a massive number of properties and the need of extension, existing approaches (e.g., Fortify, CSA 2 and Infer 3 ) provide a customizable framework together with a set of property interfaces that enable the quick customization for new properties. For instance, CSA uses a symbolic-execution engine such that, at every statement, it invokes the callback functions registered for the properties to check. The callback functions are written by the framework users in order to collect the symbolic-execution results, such as the symbolic memory and the path condition, so that we can judge the presence of any property violation at the statement. Despite the existence of many CSA-like frameworks, when high precision like path-sensitivity is required, existing static analyzers still cannot scale well with respect to a large number of properties to check, which we refer to as the extensional scalability issue. For example, our evaluation shows that CSA cannot pathsensitively check twenty properties for many programs in ten hours. Pinpoint [40] has already run out of 256GB memory for checking only eight properties.
We observe that, behind the extensional scalability issue, the key design flaw in conventional extension mechanisms (like that in CSA) is that the core static analysis engine is oblivious to the properties being checked. Although the property obliviousness gives the maximum flexibility and extensibility to the framework, it also prevents the core engine from utilizing the property-specific analysis results for optimization. This scalability issue is slightly alleviated by a class of approaches that are property-aware and demand-driven [5, 26, 31] . These techniques are scalable with respect to a small number of properties because the core engine can skip certain program statements by understanding what program states are relevant to the properties. However, in these approaches, the semantics of properties are also opaque to each other. As a result, when the number of properties grows very large, the performance of the demand-driven approaches will quickly deteriorate, as in the case of Pinpoint. To the best of our knowledge, the number of literature specifically addressing the extensional scalability issue is very limited. Readers can refer to Section 7 for a detailed discussion.
In this work, we advocate an inter-property-aware design to relax the property-property and the property-engine obliviousness so that the core static analysis engine can exploit the mutual synergies among different properties for optimization. In our analysis, such exploitation of mutual synergies are enabled by enforcing a simple value-flow-based property model, which picks out source and sink values, respectively, as well as the predicate over these values for the satisfaction of the property. For instance, for a null deference property, our property model only requires the users of our framework to indicate where a null pointer may be created, where the null dereference may happen, as well as a simple predicate that enforces the propagation of the null pointer. Surprisingly, given a set of properties specified in our property model, our static analyzer can automatically understand the overlaps and inconsistencies of the properties to check. Based on the understanding, before analyzing a program, we can make dedicated analysis plans so that, at runtime, the analyzer can transmit the analysis results on path-reachability and path-feasibility across different properties for optimization. The optimization allows us to significantly reduce redundant graph traversals and unnecessary invocation of SMT solvers, two critical performance bottlenecks of conventional approaches. Section 2 provides examples to illustrate our approach.
We have implemented our approach, named Catapult, which is a new demand-driven and compositional static analyzer with the precision of path-sensitivity. Like a conventional compositional analysis [47] , our implementation allows us to concurrently analyze functions that do not have calling relations. In Catapult, we have included all C/C++ value-flow properties that CSA checks by default. In the evaluation, we compare Catapult with three state-of-theart bug-finding tools, Pinpoint, CSA, and Infer, using a standard benchmark and ten popular industrial-sized software systems. The experimental results demonstrate that Catapult is more than 8× faster than Pinpoint but consumes only 1/7 memory. It is as efficient as CSA and Infer in terms of both time and memory cost but is much more precise. Such promising scalability of Catapult is not achieved by sacrificing the capability of bug finding. In our experiments, although the benchmark software systems have been checked by numerous free and commercial tools, Catapult is still able to detect many previously-unknown bugs, in which thirty-nine have been fixed by the developers and four have been assigned CVE IDs due to their security impact.
In summary, our main contributions are listed as following:
• An inter-property-aware design for checking value-flow properties, which mitigates the extensional scalability issue. • A series of cross-property optimization rules that can be made use of for general value-flow analysis frameworks. • A detailed implementation and a systematic evaluation that demonstrates our high scalability, precision, and recall.
OVERVIEW
The key factor that allows us to conquer the extensional scalability problem is the exploitation of the mutual synergies among different properties. In this section, we first use two simple examples to illustrate the mutual synergies and then provide a running example used in the whole paper.
Mutual Synergies
We observe that the mutual synergies among different properties are originated from their overlaps and inconsistencies.
In Figure 1a , to check memory-leak bugs, we need to track value flows from the newly-created heap pointer a to check if the pointer will be freed. 4 To check free-global-pointer bugs, we track value flows from the global variable b to check if it will be freed. 5 As illustrated, the value-flow paths to search overlap from c=ϕ(a,b) to *c=1. Being aware of such overlaps, when traversing the graph from a=malloc() for memory-leak bugs, we can record that c=ϕ(a,b) cannot reach any free operation. Then, when checking free-globalpointer bugs, we can use this recorded information to immediately stop the graph traversal at the vertex c=ϕ(a,b), thereby saving computation resources.
In Figure 1b , to check memory-leak bugs, we track value flows from the newly-created pointer a to where it is freed. To check null-dereference bugs, considering that malloc() may return a null pointer when memory allocation fails, we track value flows from the same pointer a to where it is dereferenced. The two properties have an inconsistent constraint: the former requires a 0 so that a is a valid heap pointer while the latter requires a=0 so that a is a null pointer. Being aware of the inconsistency, when traversing the graph for checking null dereferences, we can record whether pc (the path condition from a=malloc() to b=a) and pc∧a=0 can be satisfied. If pc can be satisfied but pc∧a=0 not, we can confirm that pc∧a 0 must be satisfiable without an expensive constraint-solving procedure, thus speeding up the process of checking memory leaks.
A Running Example
Let us describe a running example using the value-flow graph in Figure 3 , where we check null-deference and free-global-pointer bugs following the workflow in Figure 2 . Given the program, we firstly follow previous works to build the value-flow graph [12, 40, 44] . With the graph in hand, we check the two properties with the precision of path-sensitivity. Here, path-sensitivity means that when searching paths on the value-flow graph, we will invoke an Figure 3 : An example to illustrate our method.
SMT solver to solve path conditions and other property-specific constraints, so that infeasible paths are pruned. The Property Specifications. As is common practice, users of our framework need to provide the property specifications. The users are responsible for the correctness of the specifications.
In this paper, we focus on value-flow properties, which are checked by examining a series of value-flow paths from certain source values to some sink values. As an overview, the specifications of the two properties are described as two quadruples:
prop null-deref := (v = malloc(_); _ = * v, * v = _; v = 0; never)
prop free-glob-ptr := (glob; free(v); true; never)
As illustrated above, the specification of a value-flow property consists of four parts which are separated by the semicolons. The first and second parts are the source and sink values. The values are specified by pattern expressions, which represent the values at certain statements. The uninterested values are written as "_". In the example, the source values of null-deref and free-glob-ptr are the return pointer of malloc() and the global pointer empty_str, respectively. The sink value of null-deref is the dereferenced value c at the statement *c=1 The sink values of free-glob-ptr are the freed values at free(b) and free(d).
The third part is a property-specific constraint, which is the precondition on which the bug can happen. The constraint of nullderef is to require the value on a value-flow path to be a null pointer, i.e., v = 0. The property free-glob-ptr does not have any specific constraint and, thus, puts true in the quadruple.
The predicate "never" means that value-flow paths between the specified sources and sinks should never be feasible. Otherwise, a bug exists.
The Core Static Analysis Engine. Before the analysis, our core engine automatically makes analysis plans based on the specifications. The analysis plans include the graph traversal plan and the optimization plan. In the example, we make the following optimization plans: (1) checking free-glob-ptr before null-deref ; (2) when traversing the graph for checking free-glob-ptr, we record the vertices that cannot reach any sink vertex of null-deref. The graph traversal plan in the example is trivial, which is to traverse the graph from each source vertex of each property.
In Figure 3 , when traversing the graph from empty_str to check free-glob-ptr, the core engine will visit all vertices except p to look for free operations. According to the optimization plan, during the graph traversal, the core engine records that b and d cannot reach any dereference operation.
For null-deref, we traverse the graph from p. When visiting b and d, since the previously-recorded information tells that they cannot reach any sink vertex, we prune the subsequent paths from b and d and only need to continue the graph traversal from c.
It is noteworthy that if we check null-deref before free-glob-ptr, we only can prune one path from c for free-glob-ptr based on the results of null-deref (see Section 4.2.1). We will further explain the rationale of our analysis plans in the following sections.
VALUE-FLOW PROPERTIES
This section provides a specification model for value-flow properties with the following two motivations. On the one hand, we observe that many property-specific constraints play a significant role in performance optimization. The specific constraints of a property not only can be used to optimize the property itself, but also can benefit other properties being checked together. Existing valueflow analyses either ignore or do not well utilize property-specific constraints, which exacerbates the extensional scalability issue.
On the other hand, despite many studies on value-flow analysis [12, 33, 40, 43, 44] , we are still lack of a general and extensible specification model that can widen the opportunities of sharing analysis results across different properties. Some of the existing studies only focus on checking a specific property (e.g., memory leak [44] ). Some adopt different specifications to check the same value-flow property (e.g., double free [12, 40] ).
Preliminaries. As existing works [32, 40, 44] , we assume that the code in a program is in static single assignment (SSA) form, where every variable has only one definition [18] . Also, we say the value of a variable a flows to a variable b (or b is data-dependent on a) if a is assigned to b directly (via assignments, such as b=a) or indirectly (via pointer dereferences, such as *p=a; q=p; b=*q). Thus, a value-flow graph can be defined as a directed graph where the vertices are values in the program and the edges represent the value-flow relations. A path is called value-flow path if it is a path on the value-flow graph.
Property Specification. As defined below, we model a valueflow property as an aggregation of value-flow paths. • src and sink are two pattern expressions ( Table 1 ) that specify the source and sink values of the value-flow paths to track. • psc is the property-specific constraint that every value on the value-flow path needs to satisfy. :: pattern list • agg ∈ {never, must, never-sim, · · · } is an extensible predicate that determines how to aggregate value-flow paths to check the specified property.
In practice, we can use the quadruple to specify a wide range of value-flow properties. As discussed below, we put the properties into three categories, which are checked by aggregating a single, two, or more value-flow paths, respectively.
Null-Dereference-Like Bugs. Many program properties can be checked using a single value-flow path, such as null-deref and free-glob-ptr defined in Section 2.2, as well as a broad range of taint issues that propagate a tainted object to a program point consuming the object [22] .
Double-Free-Like Bugs. A wide range of bugs happen in a program execution because two program statements (e.g., two statements calling function free) consecutively operate on the same value (e.g., a heap pointer). Typical examples include use-after-free which is a general form of double free, as well as bugs that operate on expired resources such as using a closed file descriptor. As an example, the specification of double-free can be specified as prop double-free := (v = malloc(_); free(v); v 0; never-sim)
In the specification, the property-specific constraint v 0 requires the initial value (or equivalently, all values) on the value-flow path is a valid heap pointer. This is because v = 0 means malloc() fails to allocate memory but returns a null pointer. In this case, the free operation is harmless. The aggregate predicate "never-sim" means that the value-flow paths from the same pointer should never occur simultaneously. In other words, there is no control-flow path that goes through two different free operations on the same heap pointer. Otherwise, a double-free bug exists.
In Figure 3 , for the two value-flow paths from p to the two free operations, we can check (γ 1 ∧ γ 2 ) ∧ (γ 1 ∧ γ 4 ) ∧ (p 0) to check double-free bugs. Here, (γ 1 ∧γ 2 ) and (γ 1 ∧γ 4 ) are the path conditions of the two paths, respectively.
Memory-Leak-Like Bugs. Many bugs happen because a value (e.g., a heap pointer) must be properly handled (e.g., freed by calling function free) in any program execution but, unfortunately, not. Typical examples include all kinds of resource leaks such as file descriptor leak, internet socket leak, etc. As an example, we write the following specification for checking memory leaks:
Compared to double-free, the only difference is the aggregate predicate. The aggregate predicate "must" means that the valueflow path from a heap pointer must be able to reach a free operation. Otherwise, a memory leak exists in the program.
In Figure 3 , for the two value-flow paths from p to the two free operations, we can check the disjunction of their path conditions, i.e., ¬((γ 1 ∧ γ 2 ) ∨ (γ 1 ∧ γ 4 )) ∧ γ 1 ∧ (p 0) to determine if a memory leak exists. Here, (γ 1 ∧ γ 2 ) and (γ 1 ∧ γ 4 ) are the path conditions of the two paths, respectively. The additional γ 1 is the condition on which the heap pointer is created.
INTER-PROPERTY-AWARE ANALYSIS
Given multiple value-flow properties specified as the quadruple (src; sink; psc; agg), our inter-property-aware static analyzer then starts to check them by searching value-flow paths and finally checking bugs based on the agg predicate. Since the path aggregate step is easy to run in parallel by independently checking all possible path groups, it is not the performance bottleneck. In this paper, we concentrate on how to exploit mutual synergies among different properties to improve the efficiency of searching value-flow paths.
A Naïve Static Analyzer
For multiple value-flow properties, a naïve static analyzer checks them independently in a demand-driven manner. As illustrated in Algorithm 1, for each value-flow property, the static analyzer traverses the value-flow graph from each of the source vertices. At each step of the graph traversal, we check if psc can be satisfied with regard to the current path condition. If not, we can stop the graph traversal along the current path to save computing resources. This path-pruning process is illustrated in the shaded part of Algorithm 1, which is a critical factor to improve the analysis performance.
We observe that the properties to check usually have overlaps and inconsistencies and, thus, are not necessary to be checked independently as the naïve approach. Instead, we can exploit the overlaps and inconsistencies to facilitate the path-pruning process in Algorithm 1, thus improving the analysis efficiency. In what follows, we detail how the mutual synergies are utilized.
Optimized Intra-procedural Analysis
Based on the input property specifications, the core static analysis engine makes two plans for traversing the value-flow graph. The first is the optimization plan, which aims to prune more paths than the naïve approach. The second is the graph traversal plan, which concerns how to share paths among properties rather than prune paths. As a whole, all the plans are summarized in Table 2 . Each row of the table is a rule describing what plan we can make on certain preconditions and what benefits we can obtain from the plan. To be clear, in this section, we detail the plans in the context of scanning a single-procedure program. In the next subsection, we introduce the inter-procedural analysis.
Optimization
Plan. Based on the property specifications, we adopt several strategies to facilitate the path pruning (Rules 1 -4 in Table 2 ).
Ordering the Properties (Rule 1). Given a set of properties with different source values, we need to determine the order in which they are checked. Generally, there is no perfect order that can guarantee the best optimization results. However, we observe that a random order could significantly affect how many paths we can prune in practice.
Let us consider the example in Figure 3 again. In Section 2.2, we have explained that if free-glob-ptr is checked before null-deref, we can prune the two paths from b and d when checking null-deref. However, if we change the checking order, i.e., check null-deref before free-glob-ptr, we can only prune one path from c. In detail, when checking null-deref, the core engine records that c cannot reach any sinks of free-glob-ptr. In this case, we can prune the path from c when checking free-glob-ptr.
Intuitively, what makes the number of pruned paths different is that the number of free operations is more than dereference operations in the value-flow graph. That is, the more sink vertices in the value-flow graph, the fewer paths we can prune for the property. Inspired by this intuition and the example, the order of property checking is arranged according to the number of sink vertices. That is, the more sink vertices in the value-flow graph, the earlier we check this property.
Recording Sink-Reachability (Rule 2). Given a set of properties {prop 1 , prop 2 , · · · }, the basic idea is that, when checking prop i by traversing the value-flow graph, the core engine needs to record whether each visited vertex may reach a sink vertex of prop j (j i). With the recorded information, when checking prop j (j i) and visiting a vertex that cannot reach any of its sinks, the path from the vertex can be pruned. Section 2.2 illustrates the method.
Recording the psc-Check Results (Rules 3 & 4). Given a set of properties {prop 1 , prop 2 , · · · }, the basic idea is that, when checking prop i by traversing the value-flow graph, the core engine needs to record whether some path segments (or a set of edges) conflict with the property-specific constraint psc j of prop j (j i). With the recorded information, when checking prop j (j i) and visiting the path segments that do not satisfy its specific constraint, the path with this segment can be pruned.
Let us consider the running example in Figure 3 again and assume that γ 3 is a 0. When traversing the graph from empty_str to check free-glob-ptr, the core engine needs to record that the edge from a to c (whose condition is γ 3 , i.e., a 0) conflicts with the propertyspecific constraint of null-deref (i.e., a = 0). With this information, when checking null-deref by traversing the graph from p, we can also prune the path from the edge.
In practice, although the property-specific constraints are usually simple, the path constraints, e.g., γ 3 in the above example, are usually very sophisticated. Fortunately, thanks to the advances in the area of clause learning [6] , we are able to efficiently compute some reusable facts when using SMT solvers to check path conditions and property-specific constraints. Specifically, we compute two reusable facts when a property-specific constraint psc i conflicts with the current path condition pc.
When pc ∧ psc i is unsatisfiable, we can record the unsatisfiable core [23] , which is a set of Boolean predicates from pc, e.g.,
Since pc is the conjunction of the edge constraints on the value-flow path, each γ i corresponds to the condition of an edge ϵ i on the value-flow graph. Thus, we can record an edge set {ϵ 1 , ϵ 2 , · · · }, which conflicts with psc i . When checking the other property with the same propertyspecific constraint, if a value-flow path goes through these recorded edges, we can prune the remaining paths.
In addition to the unsatisfiable cores, we also can record the interpolation constraints [14] , which are even reusable for properties with a different property-specific constraint. In the above example, assume that psc i is a = 0 and {γ 1 ,
During the constraint solving, an SMT solver can refute the satisfi-
In the example, the interpolant γ ′ is a > 3, which provides a detailed explanation why the γ set conflicts with a = 0. In addition, the interpolant also indicates that the γ set conflicts with many other constraints like a < 0, a < 3, etc. Thus, given a property whose specific constraint conflicts with the interpolation constraint, it is sufficient to conclude that any value-flow path passing through the edge set can be pruned.
Graph Traversal
Plan. Different from the optimization plan that aims to prune paths, the graph traversal plan is to provide strategies to share paths among different properties.
Merging the Graph Traversal (Rule 5). We observe that many properties actually share the same or a part of source vertices and even the same sink vertices. If the core engine checks each property one by one, it will inevitably repeat traversing the graph from a source vertex for different properties. To avoid such repetitive graph traversal from the same source, we propose the graph traversal plan to merge the path searching processes for different properties.
As an example, in Figure 3 , since p may be a heap pointer or null, checking both null-deref and mem-leak needs to traverse the graph from p. Figure 4 illustrates how the merged traversal is performed. That is, we maintain a property set during the graph traversal to record what properties the current path contributes to. Whenever visiting a vertex, we check if a property needs to be removed from the property set. For instance, at the vertex d, we may be able to remove null-deref from the property set if we can determine d cannot reach any dereference operation. When the property set becomes empty at a vertex, the graph traversal stops immediately.
Ordering the psc-Checks (Rules 6 -8). Since the graph traversals are merged for different properties, at a vertex, e.g., a in Figure 4 , we have to check multiple property-specific constraints, e.g., a 0 for mem-leak and a = 0 for null-deref. Thus, a problem we need to address is to determine the order in which the propertyspecific constraints are checked. Since checking such constraints often needs expensive SMT solving procedures, the order of such constraint solving affects the analysis performance.
Given two property-specific constraints psc 1 and psc 2 as well as the current path condition pc, we consider three cases, i.e., psc 1 ∧ psc 2 = psc 1 , psc 1 ∧ psc 2 false, and psc 1 ∧ psc 2 = false, as listed in Table 2 . Since property-specific constraints are usually simple, the above relations between psc 1 and psc 2 are easy to compute.
First, if psc 1 ∧ psc 2 = psc 1 , it means that the solution of psc 1 also satisfies psc 2 . Thus, we check pc ∧ psc 1 first. If it is satisfiable, we can confirm that pc ∧ psc 2 must be satisfiable without an expensive SMT solving procedure.
Second, if psc 1 ∧psc 2 false, it means that there exists a solution that satisfying both psc 1 and psc 2 . In this case, we check pc ∧ psc 1 ∧ psc 2 first, if it is satisfiable, we can confirm both pc ∧ psc 1 and pc ∧ psc 2 can be satisfied without additional SMT solving procedures. In our experience, this strategy saves a lot of resources.
Third, if psc 1 ∧psc 2 = false, it means that there does not exist any solution that satisfies both psc 1 and psc 2 . In this case, we check any, e.g., pc ∧ psc 1 , first. If the current path is feasible but pc ∧ psc 1 is not satisfiable, we can confirm that pc ∧ psc 2 can be satisfied without invoking SMT solvers. This case was illustrated in Figure 1b 
Modular Inter-procedural Analysis
Scalable program analyses work by exploiting the modular structure of programs. Almost every inter-procedural analysis builds summaries for functions and reuses the function summary at its calling contexts, in order to scale to large programs [16, 47] . In Catapult, we can seamlessly extend our optimized intra-procedural analysis to modular inter-procedural analysis by exploring the local value-flow graph of each function and then stitching the local paths together to generate complete value-flow paths. In the following, we explain our design of the function summaries.
In our analysis, for each function, we build three kinds of valueflow paths as the function summaries. They are defined as below and, in Appendices A and B, we formally prove the sufficiency to generate these function summaries. Intuitively, these summaries describe how function boundaries (i.e., formal parameters and return values) partition a complete value-flow path. Using the property double-free as an example, a complete value-flow path from p to free(b) in Figure 5 is partitioned to a sub-path from p to ret p by the boundary of xmalloc(). This sub-path is an output summary of xmalloc() as defined below. After generating the function summaries, to avoid separately storing them for different properties, each function summary is labeled with a bit vector to record what properties it is built for. Assume that we need to check null-deref, double-free, and memleak in Figure 5 . The three properties are assigned with three bit vectors 0b001, 0b010, and 0b100 as their identities, respectively. As explained before, all three properties regard p as the source vertex. The sink vertices for checking double-free and mem-leak are free(b) and free(u). There are no sink vertices for null-deref. According to Definitions 4.1-4.3, we generate the following function summaries:
The summary (p, ret p) is labeled with 0b111 because all three properties regard p as the source. The summary (u, ret u) is also labeled with 0b111 because the path does not contain any propertyspecific vertices and, thus, may be used for all three properties. The summary (u, free(u)) is only labeled with 0b110 because we do not regard free(u) as the sink for null-deref.
When analyzing the main function, we concatenate its intraprocedural paths with summaries from the callee functions so as to generate a complete path. For example, a concatenation is illustrated as below and its result is labeled by 0b110, meaning that the resulting path only works for double-free and mem-leak.
(p, ret p) 0b111 • (a) • (u, free(u)) 0b110 = (p, ret p, a, u, free(u)) 0b111&0b110 = (p, ret p, a, u, free(u)) 0b110
We observe that using value-flow paths as function summaries has a significant advantage for checking multiple properties. That is, since value flow is a kind of fundamental program relations, it can be reused across different properties. This is different from existing approaches that utilize state machine to model properties and generate state-specific function summaries [19, 26] . Since different properties usually have different states, compared to our value-flow-based function summaries, such state-specific function summaries have fewer opportunities to be reused across properties.
IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the implementation details as well as the properties to check in our framework.
Path-sensitivity. We have implemented our approach as a prototype tool called Catapult on top of Pinpoint [40] . Given the source code of a program, we first compile it to LLVM bitcode, 6 on which our analysis is performed. To achieve path-sensitivity, we build a path-sensitive value-flow graph and compute path conditions following the same method of Pinpoint. The path conditions in our analysis are first-order logic formulas over bit vectors. A program variable is modeled as a bit vector, of which the length is the bit width (e.g., 32) of the variable's type (e.g., int). The path conditions are solved by Z3 [20] , a state-of-the-art SMT solver, to determine path feasibility.
Properties to check. Catapult currently supports to check twenty C/C++ properties defined in CSA, which are briefly introduced in Table 3 . 7 The twenty properties include all CSA's default C/C++ value-flow properties. All other default C/C++ properties in CSA but not in Catapult are simple ones that do not require a path-sensitive analysis. For example, the property security.insecureAPI.bcopy requires CSA report a warning whenever a program statement calling the function bcopy() is found.
Parallelization. Our analysis is performed in a bottom-up manner, in which a callee function is always analyzed before its callers. Bottom-up compositional analysis is easy to run in parallel [47] . Our special design for checking multiple properties does not prevent our analysis from parallelization. As is common practice, in Catapult, functions that do not have calling relations are analyzed in parallel.
Soundness. We implement Catapult in a soundy manner [34] . This means that the implementation soundly handles most language features and, meanwhile, includes some well-known unsound design decisions as previous works [4, 12, 40, 44, 47] . For example, in our implementation, virtual functions are resolved by classic class hierarchy analysis [21] . However, we do not handle C style function pointers, inline assembly, and library functions. We also follow the common practice to assume distinct function parameters do not 6 LLVM: https://llvm.org/ 7 More details of the properties can be found on https://clang-analyzer.llvm.org/. alias each other [33] and unroll each cycle twice on the call graph and the control flow graph. These unsound choices significantly improve the scalability but have limited negative impacts on the bug-finding capability.
EVALUATION
This section presents the systematic evaluation that demonstrates the high scalability, precision, and recall of our approach.
Experimental Setup
To demonstrate the scalability of our approach, we compared the time and memory cost of Catapult with a series of existing industrialstrength static analyzers. We also investigated their capability of finding real bugs, which confirms that our promising scalability is not achieved by sacrificing its bug-finding capability.
Baseline approaches. First of all, we compared Catapult with Pinpoint [40] , an open-source version of the most recent static analyzer of the same type. Both of the two techniques are demanddriven, compositional, and sparse static analysis with the precision of path-sensitivity. The difference is that Catapult exploits mutual synergies among different properties to speed up the analysis while Pinpoint does not. In addition, we also conducted comparison experiments on the tools using abductive inference (Infer) and symbolic execution (CSA), both of which are open source and widely-used in industry. This comparison aims to show that Catapult is competitive, as it consumes similar time and memory cost with CSA and Infer, but is much more precise. In the experiments, all tools were run with fifteen threads to take advantage of parallelization.
We also tried to compare with other static bug detection tools such as Saturn [47] , Calysto [4] , Semmle [3] , Fortify, and Klocwork. 8 However, they are either unavailable or not runnable on the experimental environment we are able to set up. The open-source static analyzer, FindBugs, 9 is not included in our experiments because it only works for Java while we focus on the analysis of C/C++ programs. We do not compare with Tricoder [39] , the static analysis platform from Google. This is because the only C/C++ analyzer in it is CSA, which has been included in our experiments.
Subjects for evaluation. To avoid possible biases on the benchmark programs, we include the standard and widely-used benchmark, SPEC CINT 2000 10 (ID = 1 ∼ 12 in Table 4 ), in our evaluation. At the same time, in order to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of Catapult on real-world projects, we also include ten industrial-sized open-source C/C++ projects (ID = 13 ∼ 22 in Table  4 ), of which the size ranges from a few thousand to two million lines of code.
Environment. All experiments were performed on a server with two Intel © Xeon © CPU E5-2698 v4 @ 2.20GHz (each has 20 cores) and 256GB RAM running Ubuntu-16.04.
Comparing with Static Analyzer of the Same Type
We first compared Catapult with Pinpoint, the most recent static analyzer of the same type. To demonstrate the power of the graph traversal plan and the optimization plan separately, we also configured our approach by disabling the optimization plan, which is denoted as Catapult * . In this experiment, we performed the whole program analysis. That is, we linked all compilation units in a project into a single file so that the static analyzers can perform cross-file analysis. Before the analysis, both Pinpoint and Catapult need to build the value-flow graph as the program intermediate representation. Since Catapult is built on top of Pinpoint, the pre-processing time and the size of value-flow graph are the same for both tools, which are almost linear to the size of a program [40] . Typically, for MySQL, a program with about two million lines of code, it takes twenty minutes to build a value-flow graph with seventy million nodes and ninety million edges. We omit the details of these data because it is not the contribution of this paper.
Efficiency. The time and memory cost of checking each benchmark program is shown in Figure 6a . Owing to the inter-propertyawareness, Catapult is about 8× faster than Pinpoint and takes only 1/7 memory usage on average. Typically, Catapult can finish checking MySQL in 5 hours, which is aligned with the industrial requirement of finishing an analysis in 5 to 10 hours [7, 35] .
When the optimization plan is disabled, Catapult * is about 3.5× faster than Pinpoint and takes 1/5 memory usage on average. Compared to the result of Catapult, it implies that the graph traversal plan and the optimization plan contribute to 40% and 60% of the time cost reduction, respectively. Meanwhile, they contribute to 70% and 30% of the memory cost reduction, respectively. As a summary, the two plans contribute similar to the time cost reduction, and the graph traversal plan is more important for the memory cost reduction because it allows us to abundantly share analysis results across different properties and avoid duplicate data storage.
Using the largest subject, MySQL, as an example, Figure 6b illustrates the growth curves of the time and the memory overhead when the properties in Table 3 are added into the core engine one by one. As illustrated, in terms of both time and memory overhead, Catapult grows much slower than Pinpoint and, thus, scales up quite gracefully.
It is noteworthy that, except for the feature of inter-propertyawareness, Catapult follows the same method of Pinpoint to build value-flow graph and perform path-sensitive analysis. Thus, they have similar performance to check a single property. Catapult performs better than Pinpoint only when multiple properties are checked together.
Effectiveness. Since both Catapult and Pinpoint are inter-procedurally path-sensitive, as shown in Table 5 -Left, they produce a similar number of bug reports (# Rep) and false positives (# FP) for all the real-world programs except for the programs that Pinpoint fails to analyze due to the out-of-memory exception.
Comparing with Other Static Analyzers
To better understand the performance of Catapult in comparison to other types of property-unaware static analyzers, we also ran Catapult against two prominent and mature static analyzers, CSA (based on symbolic execution) and Infer (based on abductive inference). Note that Infer does not classify the properties to check as Table 3 but targets at a similar range of properties, such as null dereference, memory leak, etc.
In the evaluation, CSA was run with two different configurations: one is its default configuration where a fast but imprecise rangebased solver is employed to solve path constraints, and the other uses Z3 [20] , a full-featured SMT solver, to solve path constraints. To ease the explanation, we denote CSA in the two configurations as CSA (Default) and CSA (Z3), respectively. Since CSA separately analyzes each source file and Infer only has limited capability of detecting cross-file bugs, for a fair comparison, all tools in the experiments were configured to check source files separately, and the time limit for analyzing each file is set to 60 minutes. Since a single source file is usually small, we did not encounter memory issues in the experiment but missed a lot of cross-file bugs as discussed later. Also, since we build value-flow graphs separately for each file and do not need to track cross-file value flows, the time cost of building value-flow graphs is almost negligible. Typically, for MySQL, it takes about five minutes to build value-flow graphs for all files. This time cost is included in the results discussed below.
Note that we did not change other default configurations of CSA and Infer. This is because the default configuration is usually the best in practice. Modifying their default configuration may introduce more biases.
Efficiency (Catapult vs. CSA (Z3)). When both Catapult and CSA employ Z3 to solve path constraints, they have similar precision (i.e., full path-sensitivity) in theory. However, as illustrated in Figure 6c , Catapult is much faster than CSA and consumes similar memory for all the subjects. For example, for MySQL, it takes about 36 hours for CSA to finish the analysis while Catapult takes only half an hour but consumes similar memory space. On average, Catapult is 68× faster than CSA at the cost of only 2× more memory to generate and store summaries. In spite of the 2× more memory, both of them can finish the analysis in 12GB memory, which is affordable using a common personal computer.
Efficiency (Catapult vs. CSA (Default) and Infer). As illustrated in Figure 6c , compared to Infer and the default version of CSA, Catapult takes similar (sometimes, a little higher) time and memory cost to check the subject programs. For instance, for MySQL, the largest subject program, all three tools finish the analysis in 40 minutes and consume about 10GB memory. With similar efficiency, Catapult, as a fully path-sensitive analysis, is much more precise than the other two. The lower precision of CSA and Infer leads to many false positives as discussed below.
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Together with the results on efficiency, we can conclude that Catapult is much more scalable than CSA and Infer because they have similar time and memory overhead but Catapult is much more precise and able to detect more bugs.
Detected Real Bugs
We note that the real-world software used in our evaluation is frequently scanned by commercial tools such as Coverity SAVE 11 and, 11 Coverity Scan: https://scan.coverity.com/projects/ thus, is expected to have very high quality. Nevertheless, Catapult still can detect many deeply-hidden software bugs that existing static analyzers, such as Pinpoint, CSA, and Infer, cannot detect.
At the time of writing, thirty-nine previously-unknown bugs have been confirmed and fixed by the software developers, including seventeen null pointer dereferences, ten use-after-free or double-free bugs, eleven resource leaks, and one stack-addressescape bug. Four of them even have been assigned CVE IDs due to their security impact. We have made an online list for all bugs assigned CVE IDs or fixed by their original developers. 12 As an example, Figure 7 presents a null-deference bug detected by Catapult in ImageMagick, which is a software suite for processing images. This bug is of high complexity, as it occurs in a function of more than 1,000 lines of code and the control flow involved in the bug spans across 56 functions over 9 files. Get the null pointer from the callee function.
The null pointer is dereferenced after a long propagation Figure 7 : A null-dereference bug in ImageMagick.
Since both CSA and Infer make many unsound trade-offs to achieve scalability, neither of them detects this bug. Pinpoint also cannot detect the bug because it is not memory-efficient and has to give up its analysis after the memory is exhausted.
RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, a very limited number of existing static analyses have studied how to statically check multiple program properties at once, although the problem is very important at an industrial setting. Goldberg et al. [27] make unsound assumptions and intentionally stop the analysis on a path after finding the first bug. Apparently, the approach will miss many bugs, which violates our design goal. Different from our approach that reduces unnecessary program exploration via cross-property optimization, Mordan and Mutilin [36] studied how to distribute computing resources, so that the resources are not exhausted by a few properties. Cabodi and Nocco [9] studied the problem of checking multiple properties in the context of hardware model checking. Their method has a similar spirit to our approach as it also tries to exploit mutual synergies among different properties. However, it works in a different manner specially designed for hardware. In order to avoid state-space explosion caused by large sets of properties, some other approaches studied how to decompose a set of properties into small groups [1, 10] . Owing to the decomposition, we cannot share the analysis results across different groups. There are also some static analyzers such as Semmle [3] and DOOP [8] that take advantage of datalog engines for multi-query optimization. However, they are usually not path-sensitive and their optimization methods are closely related to the sophisticated datalog specifications. In this paper, we focus on value-flow queries that can be simply specified as a quadruple and, thus, cannot benefit from the datalog engines.
CSA and Infer currently are two of the most famous open-source static analyzers with industrial strength. CSA is a symbolic-executionbased, exhaustive, and whole-program static analyzer. As a symbolic execution, it suffers from the path-explosion problem [30] . To be scalable, it has to make unsound assumptions as in the aforementioned related work [27] , limit its capability of detecting crossfile bugs, and give up full path-sensitivity by default. Infer is an abstract-interpretation-based, exhaustive, and compositional static analyzer. To be scalable, it also makes many trade-offs: giving up path-sensitivity and discarding sophisticated pointer analysis in most cases. Similarly, Tricoder, the analyzer in Google, only works intra-procedurally in order to analyze large code base [38, 39] .
In the past decades, researchers have proposed many general techniques that can check different program properties but do not consider how to efficiently check them together [4, 5, 11, 13, 15, 24, 25, 28, 37, 40, 43, 47] . Thus, we study different problems. In addition, there are also many techniques tailored only for a special program property, including null dereference [33] , use after free [48] , memory leak [12, 26, 44, 46] , buffer overflow [31] , etc. Since we focus on the extensional scalability issue for multiple properties, our approach is different from them.
Value flow properties checked in our static analyzer are also related to well-known type-state properties [41, 42] . Generally, we can regard a value-flow property as a type-state property with at most two states. Nevertheless, value-flow properties have covered a wide range of program issues. Thus, a scalable value-flow analyzer is really necessary and useful in practice. Modeling a program issue as a value-flow property has many advantages. For instance, Cherem et al. [12] pointed out that we can utilize the sparseness of value-flow graph to avoid tracking unnecessary value propagation in a control flow graph, thereby achieving better performance and outputting more concise issue reports. In this paper, we also demonstrate that using the value-flow-based model enables us to mitigate the extensional scalability issue.
CONCLUSION
We have presented Catapult, a scalable approach to checking multiple value-flow properties together. The critical factor that makes our technique fast is to exploit the mutual synergies among the properties to check. Since the number of program properties to check is quickly increasing nowadays, we believe that it will be an important research direction to study how to scale up static program analysis for simultaneously checking multiple properties.
A A CONTEXT-FREE GRAMMAR MODEL
With no loss of generality, we assume the code in each function is in SSA form, where every variable has only one definition [17] . In a program, as existing work [32, 40, 44] , we say the value of a variable a flows to a variable b (or b is data-dependent on a) if a is assigned to b directly (via an assignment, such as b=a) or indirectly (via pointer dereferences, such as *p=a; q=p; b=*q). Then, the value-flow graph of a program is defined as below.
Definition A.1 (Value-Flow Graph). A value-flow graph is a directed graph G = (V , E), where V and E are defined as following:
• V is a set of vertices, each of which is denoted by v@s, meaning that the variable v is defined or used in the statement s.
• E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges, each of which represents a data dependence relation or value flow. (v 1 @s 1 , v 2 @s 2 ) ∈ E means that the value of v 1 @s 1 flows to v 2 @s 2 .
We say π = (v 0 @s 0 , v 1 @s 1 , · · · , v n @s n ) is a value-flow path if and only if the sequence represents a path on the value-flow graph. We use π [i] to represent v i @l i on the path if 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Specifically, we use π [−1] to represent the last element of π . A value-flow path π 2 can be concatenated to the other one π 1 , denoted as π 1 π 2 , if and only if (
to represent the set of value-flow paths from a vertex in V 1 to a vertex in V 2 . The concatenation of two value-flow paths then can be extended to two sets:
In the following definitions, we use V fp , V ap , V fr , and V ar to represent four special vertex subsets. V fp and V ap represent the sets of formal and actual parameters, respectively. V fr and V ar represent the sets of formal and actual return values, respectively. We refer to the return value at a return statement as the formal return value (e.g., v@return v) and the return value at a call statement as the actual return value (e.g., v@v=func()). All proofs in this subsection are put in Appendix B.
and ∀m ≥ 0, n ≥ 0: π [m] and π [n] are in the same function. 13 As defined below, a same-level value-flow path starts and ends in the same function, but may go through some callee functions.
). The value-flow path (a@s 10 , u@s 4 , u@s 6 , b@s 10 ) in Figure 8 is a same-level value-flow path because the head of the path a@s 10 is in the same function with the tail b@s 10 .
Lemma A.5 (Same-Level Value-Flow Paths, Π SL (V i , V j )). Π SL (V i , V j ) can be generated using the following productions:
An output value-flow path, which is defined below, indicates that a checker-specific source escapes to its caller functions or upper-level caller functions.
Definition A.6 (Output Value-Flow Paths, Π OUT (V src , V fr )). Given a value-flow graph G = (V , E), a value-flow path π ∈ Π OUT (V src , V fr ) iff. π ∈ Π(V src , V fr ) and π [−1] is in the same function with π [0] or in the (upper-level) callers of π [0]'s function.
Example A.7 (Output Value-Flow Paths, Π OUT (V src , V fr )). In Figure 8, (p@s 1 , p@s 2 ) is an output value-flow path, because the source vertex p@s 1 flows to p@s 2 , which is a formal return value and in the same function with p@s 1 .
Lemma A.8 (Output Value-Flow Paths, Π OUT (V src , V fr )). Π OUT (V src , V fr ) can be generated using the following productions:
An input value-flow path, as defined below, indicates that a formal parameter of a function f may flow to a sink vertex in f or f 's callees. A source vertex in f 's caller functions may propagate to the sink through the formal parameter. 1 1 if (…) { s 1 2 free(b); s 1 3 } s 1 4 return; s 1 
can be generated using the following productions:
Lemma A.12 (Target Value-Flow Paths, Π(V src , V sink )). Given a checker (V src , V sink , F p , A q ), the set of target value-flow paths Π(V src , V sink ) can be generated using the following productions:
The context-free grammar (Productions (1) -(10)) implies that there is a Turing machine (or an algorithm) that can generate the target set Π(V src , V sink ) of value-flow paths by concatenating various value-flow paths [29] , which sets the foundation for our compositional analysis.
According to the grammar, we can prove that, in the compositional analysis, it is sufficient to generate three kinds of function summaries, i.e., value-flow paths in Π SL (V fp , V fr ), Π IN (V fp , V sink ), and Π OUT (V src , V fr ). The sufficiency is described as the following theorem and proved in the appendices.
Theorem A.13 (Summary Sufficiency). Any target value-flow path in Π(V src , V sink ) can be written as the concatenation of (1) a function's intra-procedural value-flow paths, and (2) value-flow paths in Π SL (V fp , V fr ), Π IN (V fp , V sink ), and Π OUT (V src , V fr ) from its callees.
B PROOFS
Given a global value-flow graph G = (V , E), we now explain the proofs of the lemmas and theorems in the paper. To ease the explanation, we use v src , v sink , v fp , v ap , v fr and v ar to represent elements in the sets V src , V sink , V fp , V ap , V fr and V ar , respectively. Sometimes we add superscript to them, e.g., v 0 fp , v 1 fp , · · · , to represent a list of such elements with indices. In the proofs, when we say two elements in V are in the same function, we mean they are in the same function as well as the same calling context.
Proof of Lemma
, π can be written as π 1 π 2 π 3 where π 1 ∈ Π IP (V i , V ap ), π 2 ∈ Π SL (V fp , V fr ), and π 3 ∈ Π SL (V ar , V j ). Since π 1 [−1] is an actual parameter and π 2 [0] is a formal parameter, the concatenation of π 1 and π 2 means that we enter into a callee function, say foo. Since the formal parameter π 2 [0] and the formal return value π 2 [−1] are in the same function, the concatenation of π 2 and π 3 means that we exit from the callee foo. Thus, π 1 [−1] and π 3 [0] are actually the actual parameter and actual return value at the same call site. Since π 3 is a same-level path, π 3 [0] and π 3 [−1] are in the same function. Hence, π 1 [0] and π 3 [−1] is in the same function, meaning that π = π 1 π 2 π 3 ∈ Π SL (V i , V j ).
(2) Prove:
∀π ∈ Π SL (V i , V j ), π can be intra-procedural or inter-procedural. If it is an intra-procedural path, then π ∈ Π IP (V i , V j ). For an inter-procedural path π ∈ Π SL (V i , V j ), since π [0] and π [−1] are in the same function, the value of π [0] must flow to the other function, say foo, and, then, flow back. The function foo must be callee function because because if a value is returned to the caller function, it cannot flow back to the same function in the same calling context. Therefore, a path in Π SL (V i , V j ) must be in the following form, where v i ∈ V i , v j ∈ V j , the value flow (v p ap , v p+1 fp ) is a function call, and the value flow (v p+1 fr , v p+2 ar ) is a function return, (p = 1, 2, · · · , 2n + 1).
First, according to Definitions A.3 and A.6, it is straightforward to conclude ∀π ∈ Π SL (V src , V fr ) : π ∈ Π OUT (V src , V fr ). Second, ∀π ∈ Π OUT (V src , V fr )Π SL (V ar , V fr ), it can be written as π 1 π 2 where π 1 ∈ Π OUT (V src , V fr ) and π 2 ∈ Π SL (V ar , V fr ). Since π 1 [−1] is a formal return value, the concatenation of π 1 and π 2 means a function return. Thus, π 2 is in the caller function of the source value π 1 [0]. According to Definition A.6, π = π 1 π 2 ∈ Π OUT (V src , V fr ).
(2) Prove: Π OUT (V src , V fr ) ⊆ Π SL (V src , V fr ) ∪ Π OUT (V src , V fr )Π SL (V ar , V fr ) According to Definition A.6, ∀π ∈ Π OUT (V src , V fr ), it must be in the form (v src , ..., v fr ). And v fr is in the same function with v src or v fr is in certain (direct or indirect) callers of v src . If v fr is in the same function with v src , it means π is a same-level path and, thus, is in the set Π SL (V src , V fr ).
If v fr is in a caller function of v src , since a program state only can transit to its callers via function return, (v src , ..., v fr ) can be split into multiple parts concatenated by return value flows (v fr , v ar ):
(v src ...v 0 fr )
Thus, ∀π = (v src , ..., v fr ) ∈ Π OUT (V src , V fr ), if v fr is in a caller function of v src , π must be in the set Π OUT (V src , V fr )Π SL (V ar , V fr ). □ Proof of Lemma A.11. Proof.
(1) Prove:
First, according to Definitions A.3 and A.9, it is straightforward to conclude ∀π ∈ Π SL (V fp , V sink ) : π ∈ Π IN (V fp , V sink ). Second, ∀π ∈ Π SL (V fp , V ap )Π IN (V fp , V sink ), it can be written as π 1 π 2 where π 1 ∈ Π SL (V fp , V ap ) and π 2 ∈ Π IN (V fp , V sink ). Since π 1 [−1] is an actual parameter, the concatenation of π 1 and π 2 means a function call. Thus, π 2 is in the callee function of the source value π 1 [0]. According to Definition A.9, π = π 1 π 2 ∈ Π IN (V fp , V sink ).
According to Definition A.9, ∀π ∈ Π IN (V fp , V sink ), π must be in the form (v fp , ..., v sink ), where (1) v sink is in the same function with v fp or (2) v sink is in certain (direct or indirect) callee of v fp . If v sink is in the same function with v fp , (V fp ...V sink ) ∈ Π SL (V fp , V sink ).
If V sink is in some callee of V fp , since a state only can transit to its callees via function calls, (V fp ...V sink ) can be split into multiple parts concatenated by function-call value flows (v ap , v fp ):
Thus, ∀π = (v src , ..., v fr ) ∈ Π IN (V fp , V sink ), if V sink is in some callee of V fp , π must be in the set Π SL (V fp , V ap )Π IN (V fp , V sink ). □ Proof of Lemma A.12.
Proof. To ease explanation, let us use RHS to represent the set of value-flow paths in the right-hand side of Productions (7)-(10).
(1) Prove: Π(V fp , V sink ) ⊇ RHS According to the definitions, it is straightforward to conclude that ∀π ∈ RHS : π ∈ Π(V src , V sink ).
(2) Prove: Π(V fp , V sink ) ⊆ RHS In a similar manner, after analyzing Productions (8)-(10), we can conclude that when analyzing a function, it is sufficient to have value-flow paths in Π IN (V fp , V sink ), Π OUT (V src , V fr ) and Π SL (V fp , V fr ) from callees. □
